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Representing a sparse histogram, or more generally a sparse vector,
is a fundamental task in differential privacy. An ideal solution would
use space close to information-theoretical lower bounds, have an
error distribution that depends optimally on the desired privacy
level, and allow fast random access to entries in the vector. However,
existing approaches have only achieved two of these three goals.
In this paper we introduce the Approximate Laplace Projection
(ALP) mechanism for approximating 𝑘-sparse vectors. This mech-
anism is shown to simultaneously have information-theoretically
optimal space (up to constant factors), fast access to vector entries,
and error of the same magnitude as the Laplace-mechanism applied
to dense vectors. A key new technique is a unary representation of
small integers, which we show to be robust against “randomized
response” noise. This representation is combined with hashing, in
the spirit of Bloom filters, to obtain a space-efficient, differentially
private representation.
Our theoretical performance bounds are complemented by sim-
ulations which show that the constant factors on the main perfor-
mance parameters are quite small, suggesting practicality of the
technique.
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1 INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental results in differential privacy is that a
histogram can be made differentially private by adding noise from
the Laplace distribution to each entry of the histogram before it is
released [7]. The expectedmagnitude of the noise on each histogram
entry is𝑂 (1/Y), where Y is the privacy parameter, and this is known
to be optimal [12]. In fact, there is a sense in which the Laplace
mechanism is optimal [14]. However, some histograms of interest
are extremely sparse, and cannot be represented in explicit form.
Consider, for example, a histogram of the number of HTTP requests
to various servers. Already the IPv4 address space has over 4 billion
addresses, and the number of unique, valid URLs have long exceeded
1012, so it is clearly not feasible to create a histogram with a (noisy)
counter for each possible value.
Korolova, Kenthapadi, Mishra, and Ntoulas [13] showed that it
is possible to achieve approximate differential privacy with space
that depends only on the number of non-zero entries in the his-
togram. However, for (Y, 𝛿)-differential privacy the upper bound





, which is sig-
nificantly worse than the Laplace mechanism for small 𝛿 . Cormode,
Procopiuc, Srivastava, and Tran [5] showed how to achieve pure






, where 𝑑 is the dimension of the histogram, i.e., the num-
ber of entries. While both these methods sacrifice accuracy they
are very fast, allowing access to entries of the private histogram
in constant time. If access time is not of concern, it is possible
to combine small space with small per-entry error, as shown by
Balcer and Vadhan [2]. They achieve an error distribution that is
comparable to the Laplace mechanism (up to constant factors) and
space proportional to the sum 𝑛 of all histogram entries — but the
time to access a single entry is 𝑂 (𝑛/Y), which is excessive for large
datasets.
1.1 Our results
Our contribution is a mechanism that achieves optimal error and
space (up to constant factors) with only a small increase in access
time. The mechanism works for either approximate or pure differ-
ential privacy, with the former providing faster access time. Our
main results are summarized in Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal Version of Theorems 5.10 and 5.11).
Let 𝑥 be a histogram with 𝑑 entries each bounded by some value 𝑢
where at most 𝑘 entries have non-zero values. Given privacy param-
eters Y > 0 and 𝛿 ≥ 0, there exists an (Y, 𝛿)-differentially private
algorithm to represent 𝑥 using 𝑂 (𝑘 log(𝑑 + 𝑢)) bits with per-entry
error matching the Laplace mechanism up to constant factors. The
access time is 𝑂 (log(1/𝛿)) when 𝛿 > 0 and 𝑂 (log(𝑑)) when 𝛿 = 0.
Here we assume that 𝑘 = Ω(log(𝑑)). Otherwise the mechanism
has an additional term of 𝑂 (log2 (𝑑)) or 𝑂 (log(𝑑) log(1/𝛿)) bits
in its space usage for pure and approximate differential privacy,
respectively.
1.2 Techniques
On a high level, we treat “small” and “large” values of the histogram
differently. Large values are handled by the thresholding technique
developed in [5, 13]. For small entries, we represent them using a























that their length is logarithmic in either𝑑 (for Y-DP) or 1/𝛿 (for (Y, 𝛿)-
DP). Privacy is achieved by perturbing each bit using randomized
response [15]. As it turns out, the unary encoding is redundant
enough to allow accurate estimation even when the probability of
flipping each bit is a constant bounded away from 1/2. In order to
pack all unary representations into small space, we use hashing
to randomize the position of each bit in the unary representation
of a given entry. The access time is linear in the length of the bit
representation, given constant time evaluation of the hash function.
Interestingly, although hash collisions can lead to overestimates,
they do not influence the error asymptotically.
We remark here that a direct application of randomized response
does not give the desired 𝑂 (1/Y) error dependency, but we solve
this issue with an initial scaling step that gives Y-differential pri-
vacy when combined with randomized response. Though the dis-
cussion above has been phrased in terms of histograms, which
makes the comparison to earlier work easier, our techniques apply
more generally to representing sparse real vectors, with privacy
for neighboring datasets with bounded ℓ1-distance.
1.3 Overview
In Section 2 we define differential privacy for vectors, discuss the
Laplace mechanism, and provide probabilistic tools necessary for
the analysis. In Section 3 we discuss related work on differentially
private sparse histograms. In Section 4 we introduce the Approx-
imate Laplace Projection (ALP) mechanism and analyze its theo-
retical guarantees. In Section 5 we improve space and access time
using techniques from earlier work [5, 13]. In Section 6 we evaluate
the performance of the ALP mechanism based on simulations. In
Section 7 we present suggestions for practical applications. We
conclude the paper by stating an open problem in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Problem Setup. In this work, we consider 𝑑-dimensional 𝑘-sparse
vectors of non-negative real values. We say that a vector 𝑥 ∈ R𝑑+
is 𝑘-sparse if it contains at most 𝑘 non-zero entries. We assume
that 𝑘 = Ω(log(𝑑)). All entries are bounded from above by a value
𝑢 ∈ R, i.e.,max𝑖∈[𝑑 ] 𝑥𝑖 =: ∥𝑥 ∥∞ ≤ 𝑢. Here [𝑑] is the set of integers
{1, . . . , 𝑑}. We consider the problem of constructing an algorithm
M for releasing a differentially private representation of 𝑥 , i.e.,
𝑥 := M(𝑥). Note that 𝑥 does not itself need to be 𝑘-sparse.
Utility Measures. We use two measures for the utility of an algo-
rithm M. We define the per-entry error as |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 | for any 𝑖 ∈ [𝑑].
We define themaximum error asmax𝑖∈[𝑑 ] |𝑥𝑖 −𝑥𝑖 | = ∥𝑥 −𝑥 ∥∞. We
compare the utility of algorithms using the expected per-entry and
maximum error and compare the tail probabilities of the per-entry
error of our algorithm with the Laplace mechanism introduced
below.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy is a constraint to limit
privacy loss introduced by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [7].
We use definitions and results as presented by Dwork and Roth [8].
Intuitively, a differentially private algorithm ensures that a slight
change in the input does not significantly impact the probability
of seeing any particular output. We measure the distance between
inputs using their ℓ1-distance. In this work, two vectors are neigh-
bors iff their ℓ1-distance is at most 1. That is for all neighboring
vectors 𝑥, 𝑥 ′ ∈ R𝑑+ we have ∥𝑥 − 𝑥 ′∥1 :=
∑
𝑖∈[𝑑 ] |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥 ′𝑖 | ≤ 1. We
can now define differential privacy for neighboring vectors.
Definition 2.1 (Differential privacy [8, Def 2.4]). Given Y > 0 and
𝛿 ≥ 0, a randomized algorithm M : R𝑑+ → R is (Y, 𝛿)-differentially
private if for all subsets of outputs 𝑆 ⊆ R and pairs of 𝑘-sparse
input vectors 𝑥, 𝑥 ′ ∈ R𝑑+ such that ∥𝑥 − 𝑥 ′∥1 ≤ 1 it holds that:
Pr[M(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ 𝑒Y · Pr[M(𝑥 ′) ∈ 𝑆] + 𝛿 .
M satisfies approximate differential privacy when 𝛿 > 0 and
pure differential privacy when 𝛿 = 0. In particular, a pure differen-
tially private algorithm satisfies Y-differential privacy. The following
properties of differential privacy are useful in this paper.
Lemma 2.2 (Post-processing [8, Proposition 2.1]). LetM : R𝑑+ →
R be an (Y, 𝛿)-differentially private algorithm and let 𝑓 : R → R ′
be any randomized mapping. Then 𝑓 ◦ M : R𝑑+ → R ′ is (Y, 𝛿)-
differentially private.
Lemma 2.3 (Composition [8, Theorem 3.16]). LetM1 : R𝑑+ →
R1 andM2 : R𝑑+ → R2 be randomized algorithms such that 𝑀1 is
(Y1, 𝛿1)-differentially private and M2 is (Y2, 𝛿2)-differentially pri-
vate. Then the algorithm M where M(𝑥) = (M1 (𝑥),M2 (𝑥)) is
(Y1 + Y2, 𝛿1 + 𝛿2)-differentially private.
Throughout this paper, we clamp the output of all algorithms to
the interval [0, 𝑢]. An estimate outside this interval is due to noise
and clamping outputs cannot increase the error. It follows from
Lemma 2.2 that clamping the output does not affect privacy. We
clamp the output implicitly to simplify presentation.
Probabilistic Tools. The Laplace Mechanism introduced by Dwork,
McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [7] satisfies pure differential privacy
by adding noise calibrated to the ℓ1-distance to each entry. For
completeness, Algorithm 1 provides a formulation of the Laplace
mechanism in the context of releasing an Y-differentially private
representation of a sparse vector.
Algorithm 1: The Laplace Mechanism
Parameters :Y > 0.
Input :𝑘-sparse vector 𝑥 ∈ R𝑑+.
Output :Y-differentially private approximation of 𝑥 .
(1) Let 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + [𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∈ [𝑑], where [𝑖 ∼ Lap(1/Y).
(2) Release 𝑥 .
Here Lap(1/Y) is the Laplace distribution with scale parameter
1/Y. The PDF and CDF of the distribution are presented in Defi-
nitions 2.4 and 2.5 and the expected error and tail bound of the
mechanism are shown in Propositions 2.6 and 2.7. The Laplace
mechanism works well for vectors with low dimensionality and
serves as a baseline for our work. However, it is impractical or even
infeasible in the setting of 𝑘-sparse vectors. The output vector is
dense, and as such the space requirement scales linearly in the input
dimensionality 𝑑 .
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Definition 2.4. The probability density function of the Laplace
distribution centered around 0 with scale parameter 1/Y is
𝑓 (𝜏) = Y
2
𝑒−|𝜏 |Y .
Definition 2.5. The cumulative distribution function of the Laplace
distribution centered around 0 with scale parameter 1/Y is:




𝜏Y , if 𝜏 < 0
1 − 12𝑒
−𝜏Y , if 𝜏 ≥ 0
Proposition 2.6 (Expected Error [8, Theorem 3.8]). The ex-
pected per-entry and maximum error of the Laplace mechanism are






Proposition 2.7 (Tail bound [8, Theorem 3.8]). With probabil-
ity at least 1 −𝜓 we have:






Random rounding or stochastic rounding is used for rounding a
real value probabilistically based on its fractional part. We define
random rounding for any real 𝑟 ∈ R as follows:
RandRound (𝑟 ) =
{
⌈𝑟⌉ with probability 𝑟 − ⌊𝑟⌋
⌊𝑟⌋ with probability 1 − (𝑟 − ⌊𝑟⌋)
Lemma 2.8. The expected error of random rounding is maximized
when 𝑟 − ⌊𝑟⌋ = 0.5. For any 𝑟 we have:
E[|𝑟 − RandRound (𝑟 ) |] ≤ 1
2
.
Randomized response was first introduced by Warner [15]. The
purpose of the mechanism is to achieve plausible deniability by
changing one’s answer to some question with probability 𝑝 and
answer truthfully with probability 𝑞 = 1−𝑝 . We define randomized
response for a boolean value 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
RandResponse (𝑏, 𝑝) =
{
1 − 𝑏 with probability 𝑝
𝑏 with probability 𝑞
Universal Hashing. A hash family is a collection of functions H
mapping keys from a universe𝑈 to a range 𝑅. A familyH is called
universal, if each pair of different keys collides with probability at
most 1/|𝑅 |, where the randomness is taken over the random choice
of ℎ ∈ H . A particularly efficient construction that uses𝑂 (log |𝑈 |)
bits and constant evaluation time is presented in [6].
Model of Computation. We use the𝑤-bit word RAM model de-
fined by Hagerup [11] where𝑤 = Θ(log(𝑑) + log(𝑢)). This model
allows constant time memory access and basic operations on𝑤-bit
words. As such, we can store a 𝑘-sparse vector using𝑂 (𝑘 log(𝑑+𝑢))
bits with constant lookup time using a hash table. We assume that
the privacy parameters Y and 𝛿 can be represented in a single word.
Negative Values. In this paper, we consider vectors with non-
negative real values, but the mechanism can be generalized for
negative values using the following reduction. Let 𝑣 ∈ R𝑑 be a
real valued 𝑘-sparse vector. Construct 𝑥,𝑦 ∈ R𝑑+ from 𝑣 such that
𝑥𝑖 = max(𝑣𝑖 , 0) and 𝑦𝑖 = −min(𝑣𝑖 , 0). By construction both 𝑥 and
𝑦 are 𝑘-sparse and the ℓ1-distance between vectors is preserved. We
can access elements in 𝑣 as 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 . As such, any differentially
private representation of 𝑥 and 𝑦 can be used as a differentially
private representation of 𝑣 with at most twice the error.
3 RELATEDWORK
Previous work on releasing differentially private sparse vectors
primarily focused on the special case of discrete vectors in the
context of releasing the histogram of a dataset.
Korolova, Kenthapadi, Mishra, and Ntoulas [13] first introduced
an approximately differentially private mechanism for the release
of a sparse histogram. A similar mechanism was later introduced
independently by Bun, Nissim, and Stemmer [3] in another con-
text. The mechanism adds noise to non-zero entries and removes






threshold is chosen such that the probability of releasing an en-






. Since 𝛿 is usually chosen to be negligible
in the input size, we assume that 𝛿 ≤ 1/𝑘 . As such, the expected





. We discuss the per-entry error be-
low. Their mechanism is designed to satisfy differential privacy for
discrete data. We extend their technique to real-valued data as part
of Section 5, where we combine it with our mechanism.
Cormode, Procopiuc, Srivastava, and Tran [5] introduced a dif-
ferentially private mechanism in their work on range queries for
sparse data. The mechanism adds noise to all entries and removes






threshold is used to reduce the expected output size. The number
of noisy entries above 𝑡 is 𝑂 (𝑘) with high probability. The con-
struction time of a naive implementation of their technique scales
linearly in 𝑑 . They improve on this by sampling from a binomial
distribution to determine the number of zero entries to store. They
show that their approach produces the same output distribution
as a naive implementation that adds noise to every entry. Their
mechanism works for real-valued data in a straightforward way.
Since the expected number of non-zero entries in the output
is 𝑂 (𝑘) for both mechanisms above, their memory requirement
is 𝑂 (𝑘 log(𝑑 + 𝑢)) bits using a hash table. An entry is accessed in
constant time. The expected per-entry error depends on the true
value of the entry. If the noisy value is above the threshold with
sufficiently high probability, the expected error is𝑂 (1/Y). However,
this does not hold for entries that are likely removed. Consider
for example an entry with a true value exactly at the threshold
𝑡 . This entry is removed for any negative noise added. As such











for the two mechanisms, respectively.
In their work on differential privacy on finite computers, Bal-
cer and Vadhan [2] introduced several algorithms including some
with similar utility as the mechanisms described above. Moreover,






expected per-entry error of any algorithm that always outputs a
sparse histogram. (See [2, Theorem 7.2] for the precise technical
statement.) Here 𝑛 is the number of rows in the dataset, i.e., the sum
of all entries of the histogram. This lower bound means that an algo-
rithm that always outputs a 𝑂 (𝑘)-sparse histogram cannot achieve
𝑂 (1/Y) expected per-entry error for all input. They bypass this
3
Algorithm Space (bits) Access time Per-entry error Maximum error






































































Table 1: Comparison with previous work of expected values for worst-case input. The first four rows are results on
Y-differential privacy, and the last two are on (Y, 𝛿)-differential privacy. The 𝑂-notation suppresses logarithmic factors.
bound by producing a compact representation of a dense histogram.

















. Note that their problem
setup differs from ours in that each entry is bounded only by 𝑛 such
that ∥𝑥 ∥∞ ≤ 𝑛. That is, 𝑛 serves a similar purpose as 𝑢 does in our
setup. We do not know how to extend their approach to our setup
with real-valued input.
In light of the results achieved in previous work, our motivation
is to design a mechanism that achieves three properties simulta-
neously: 𝑂 (1/Y) expected per-entry error for arbitrary input, fast
access, and (asymptotically) optimal space. Previous approaches
only achieved at most two of these properties simultaneously. More-
over, we want the per-entry error to match the tail bounds of the
Laplace mechanism up to constant factors. We construct a com-
pact representation of a dense vector to bypass the lower bound
for sparse vectors by Balcer and Vadhan [2]. The access time of
our mechanism is𝑂 (log(𝑑)) and𝑂 (log(1/𝛿)) for pure and approx-
imate differential privacy, respectively. Table 1 summarizes the
results of previous work and our approach.
4 THE ALP MECHANISM
In this section, we introduce the Approximate Laplace Projection
(ALP) mechanism
1
and give an upper bound on the expected per-
entry error. The ALP mechanism consists of two algorithms. The
first algorithm constructs a differentially private representation of
a 𝑘-sparse vector and the second estimates the value of an entry
based on its representation.
4.1 A 1-differentially private algorithm
We start by considering the special case of Y = 1 and later generalize
to all values of Y > 0. Moreover, the mechanism works well only
for entries bounded by a parameter 𝛽 . In general, this would mean
that we had to set 𝛽 = 𝑢 if we only were to use the ALP mechanism.
However, in Section 5 we will discuss how to set 𝛽 smaller and still
perform well for all entries.
1
The name is chosen to indicate that the error distribution is approximately like the
Laplace distribution, and that we project the sparse vector to a much lower-dimensional
representation. It also celebrates the mountains, whose silhouette plays a role in a
certain random walk considered in the analysis of the ALP mechanism.
Algorithm 2: ALP1-projection
Parameters :𝛼, 𝛽 > 0, and 𝑠 ∈ N.
Input :𝑘-sparse vector 𝑥 ∈ R𝑑+ where 𝑠 > 2𝑘 .
Sequence of hash functions from domain [𝑑]






Output :1-differentially private representation of 𝑥 .
(1) Apply random rounding to a scaled version of each





(2) Construct 𝑧 ∈ {0, 1}𝑠×𝑚 by hashing the unary
representations of 𝑦 such that:
𝑧𝑎,𝑏 =
{
1, ∃𝑖 : 𝑏 ≤ 𝑦𝑖 and ℎ𝑏 (𝑖) = 𝑎
0, otherwise








(4) Release ℎ and 𝑧.
In the first step of the projection algorithm, we scale every non-
zero entry by a parameter of the algorithm and use random round-
ing to map each such entry to an integer. We then store the unary
representation of these integers in a two-dimensional bit-array
using a sequence of universal hash functions [4]. We call this bit-
array the embedding. Lastly, we apply randomized response on the
embedding to achieve privacy. The pseudocode of the algorithm is
given in Algorithm 2 and we discuss it next.
Figure 1 shows an example of an embedding before applying
randomized response. The input is a vector 𝑥 where the 𝑖th entry
𝑥𝑖 is the only non-zero value. The result of evaluating 𝑖 for each
hash function is shown in the table at the bottom and the𝑚 = 8
bits representing the 𝑖th entry in the bit-array are highlighted.
In Step (1) of the algorithm, 𝑥𝑖 is scaled by 1/𝛼 and randomized
rounding is applied to the scaled value. This results in 𝑦𝑖 = 5. Using
the hash functions, we represent this value in unary encoding by
setting the first five bits to 1 in Step (2), where the 𝑗 th bit is selected
by evaluating the hash function ℎ 𝑗 on 𝑖 . The final three bits are
unaffected by the entry. Finally, we apply randomized response in
each cell of the bit-array. The bit-array after applying randomized
response is not shown here, but we present it later in Figure 2. Both
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Figure 1: Embedding with𝑚 = 8, 𝑠 = 5 and 𝑦𝑖 = 5.
The 𝑖th entry is the only non-zero entry.
the bit-array and the hash functions are the differentially private
representation of the input vector 𝑥 . We use this construction when
estimating the value of 𝑥𝑖 later.
The algorithm takes three parameters 𝛼, 𝛽 , and 𝑠 . The parameters
𝛼 and 𝑠 are adjustable. We discuss these parameters later as part
of the error analysis. In Section 6 we discuss how to select values
for 𝛼 and 𝑠 . Throughout the paper we sometimes assume that 𝛼
is a constant and 𝑠 is a constant multiple of 𝑘 that is 𝛼 = Θ(1)
and 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘). The parameter 𝛽 bounds the values stored in the
embedding. We discuss 𝛽 as part of the error analysis as well.
Lemma 4.1. Algorithm 2 satisfies 1-differential privacy.
Proof. Let 𝑥, 𝑥 ′ ∈ R𝑑+ denote two neighboring vectors.We prove
the lemma in several steps. First, the vectors differ only in their
𝑖th entry. In this case, we start by assuming that only a single bit
of 𝑧 is affected by changing 𝑥 to 𝑥 ′ and that there are no hash
collisions. We then allow them to differ in several bits and include
hash collisions. Finally, we generalize to the case that they differ in
more than one entry.
Assume that 𝑧 differs only in a single bit for 𝑥 and 𝑥 ′. Let 𝑌
denote the event that the affected bit is set to one after running
the algorithm. Let 𝑝 = 1𝛼+2 be the parameter of the randomized
response step and let 𝑞 = 1−𝑝 . Then the probability of 𝑌 occurring
with input 𝑥 is Pr[𝑌 | 𝑥] = (1 − 𝑟 ) · 𝑝 + 𝑟 · 𝑞, where 𝑟 = 𝑥𝑖𝛼 −⌊
min(𝑥𝑖 ,𝑥 ′𝑖 )
𝛼
⌋
denotes the probability of the bit being one before the
randomized response step. Similarly for 𝑥 ′ we define 𝑟 ′ =
𝑥 ′𝑖
𝛼 −⌊
min(𝑥𝑖 ,𝑥 ′𝑖 )
𝛼
⌋
. The minimum term is needed whenmax(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥 ′𝑖 ) is a
multiple of 𝛼 such that max(𝑟, 𝑟 ′) = 1. We find the difference in
the probability of 𝑌 occurring for 𝑥 and 𝑥 ′ as:
Pr[𝑌 | 𝑥] − Pr[𝑌 | 𝑥 ′] = ((1 − 𝑟 )𝑝 + 𝑟𝑞) − ((1 − 𝑟 ′)𝑝 + 𝑟 ′𝑞)
= (𝑟 − 𝑟 ′) · (𝑞 − 𝑝)
=





𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥 ′𝑖
𝛼 + 2 .
By symmetry, the absolute difference in probability for setting
the bit to either zero or one is
|𝑥𝑖−𝑥 ′𝑖 |
𝛼+2 . Let 𝑍 be an arbitrary output
of Algorithm 2. Since 𝑥 and 𝑥 ′ agree on all but the 𝑖th entry, the
change in probability of outputting 𝑍 depends only on the affected
bit. Let 𝑌 ′ denote the event that the bit agrees with output 𝑍 . Then
we find the ratio of probabilities of outputting 𝑍 as:
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′) = 𝑍 ]
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥) = 𝑍 ] =
Pr[𝑌 ′ | 𝑥 ′]
Pr[𝑌 ′ | 𝑥] ≤















Here the second inequality follows from 𝑝 ≤ Pr[𝑌 ′ | 𝑥] ≤ 𝑞.
From here it is easy to take hash collisions into account as follows:
Let 𝑝 ′ denote the probability of 𝑌 occurring after setting the 𝑖th
entry to zero. That is, we have 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝 ′ ≤ 𝑞 and Pr[𝑌 | 𝑥] =
(1 − 𝑟 ) · 𝑝 ′ + 𝑟 · 𝑞. The absolute difference in probability is still
bounded such that Pr[𝑌 | 𝑥] −Pr[𝑌 | 𝑥 ′] ≤ |𝑥𝑖−𝑥
′
𝑖 |
𝛼+2 . As such it still
holds that:
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′) = 𝑍 ]
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥) = 𝑍 ] ≤ 𝑒
|𝑥𝑖−𝑥 ′𝑖 | .
Next, we remove the assumption that only a single bit is affected
by composing probabilities. We provide the following inductive
construction. Let 𝑥, 𝑥 ′ ∈ R𝑑+ be vectors that differ in the 𝑖th entry








differences affects exactly one bit each. Again, let 𝑍 be an arbitrary
output of Algorithm 2. Applying the upper bound from above twice,
we may bound the change in probabilities by:
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′) = 𝑍 ]
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥) = 𝑍 ] =
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′′) = 𝑍 ]
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥) = 𝑍 ]
· Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥
′) = 𝑍 ]
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′′) = 𝑍 ]
≤ 𝑒 |𝑥𝑖−𝑥
′′
𝑖 | · 𝑒 |𝑥
′′




which can be applied inductively if changing an entry affects more
than two bits.
We are now ready to generalize to any vectors 𝑥, 𝑥 ′ ∈ R𝑑+, i.e.,
where vectors may differ in more than a single position. Using the
5
bound from above, we can bound the ratio of probabilities by:
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′) = 𝑍 ]








𝑖∈[𝑑 ] |𝑥𝑖−𝑥 ′𝑖 |
= 𝑒 ∥𝑥−𝑥
′ ∥1 .
The privacy loss is thus bounded by the ℓ1-distance of the vectors
for any output. Recall that the ℓ1-distance is upper bounded by 1 for
two neighboring vectors. As such the algorithm is 1-differentially
private as for any pair of neighboring vectors 𝑥 and 𝑥 ′ and any
subset of outputs 𝑆 we have:
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ 𝑒 ∥𝑥−𝑥
′ ∥1 Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′) ∈ 𝑆]
≤ 𝑒 · Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′) ∈ 𝑆] .
□
The following lemma summarizes the space complexity of stor-
ing the bit-array and the collection of hash functions.
Lemma 4.2. The number of bits required to store ℎ and 𝑧 is
𝑂
(





















bits to store ℎ. □
4.2 Estimating an entry
We now introduce the algorithm to estimate an entry based on the
embedding from Algorithm 2. When accessing the 𝑖th entry, we
estimate the value of 𝑦𝑖 and multiply by 𝛼 to reverse the initial
scaling of 𝑥𝑖 . The estimate of 𝑦𝑖 is chosen to maximize a partial
sum. If multiple values maximize the sum we use their average.
Intuition. The first 𝑦𝑖 bits representing the 𝑖th entry are set to
one before applying noise in Algorithm 2, cf. Figure 1. The last
𝑚 − 𝑦𝑖 bits are zero, except if there are hash collisions. Some bits
might be flipped due to randomized response, but we expect the
majority of the first 𝑦𝑖 bits to be ones and the majority of the
remaining𝑚−𝑦𝑖 bits to be zeros. As such the estimate of𝑦𝑖 is based
on prefixes maximizing the difference between ones and zeros. The
pseudocode for the algorithm is given as Algorithm 3.
Figure 2 shows an example of Algorithm 3. The example is based
on the embedding from Figure 1 after adding noise. The plot shows
the value of 𝑓 for all candidate estimates. This sum is maximized at
positions 3 and 5. This is visualized as the global peaks in the plot.
The estimate is the average of those positions.






Proof. We can compute all partial sums by evaluating each bit
(𝑧ℎ1 (𝑖),1, . . . , 𝑧ℎ𝑚 (𝑖),𝑚) once using dynamic programming. As such





. We have 𝑚 = 𝑂 (𝛽)
when 𝛼 = Θ(1). □
Algorithm 3: ALP1-estimator
Parameters :𝛼 > 0.
Input :Embedding 𝑧 ∈ {0, 1}𝑠×𝑚 . Sequence of hash
functions ℎ = (ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚). Index 𝑖 ∈ [𝑑].
Output :Estimate of 𝑥𝑖 .




2𝑧ℎ𝑎 (𝑖),𝑎 − 1
(2) Let 𝑃 be the set of arguments maximizing 𝑓 . That is,
𝑃 = {𝑛 ∈ {0, . . . ,𝑚} : 𝑓 (𝑎) ≤ 𝑓 (𝑛) for all 𝑎 ∈ {0, . . . ,𝑚}}
(3) Let 𝑦𝑖 = average(𝑃)
(4) Return 𝑦𝑖 · 𝛼 .
Figure 2: Estimation of 𝑖th entry from Figure 1.
The partial sum is maximized at indices 3 and 5.
The estimate is 4, while the true value was 5.
We now analyze the per-entry error of Algorithm 3. We first
analyze the expected error based on the parameters of the algorithm.
The results are presented in Lemma 4.8. In Lemmas 4.9 and 4.10 we
bound the tail distribution of the per-entry error of the algorithm.
Lemma 4.4. The expected per-entry error of Algorithm 3 is bounded
by ( 12 + E[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |]) · 𝛼 for entries with a value of at most 𝛽 .
Proof. It is clear that the error of the 𝑖th entry is 𝛼 times the
difference between 𝑦𝑖 and
𝑥𝑖





− 𝑦𝑖 |] ≤ E[|
𝑥𝑖
𝛼
− 𝑦𝑖 |] + E[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |]
≤ 1
2
+ E[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |] .
The last inequality follows from Lemma 2.8. □
We find an upper bound on E[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |] by analyzing simple
random walks. A simple random walk is a stochastic process such
that 𝑆0 = 0 and 𝑆𝑛 =
∑𝑛
ℓ=1 𝑋ℓ , where 𝑋 are independent and
identically distributed random variables with Pr[𝑋ℓ = 1] = 𝑝 and
Pr[𝑋ℓ = −1] = 1 − 𝑝 = 𝑞.
Lemma 4.5. Let 𝑆 be a simple random walk with 𝑝 < 𝑞. At any
step 𝑛 the probability that there exists a later step ℓ > 𝑛 such that
𝑆ℓ > 𝑆𝑛 is
𝑝
𝑞 .
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 1 by Alm [1]. □
For our analysis, we are concerned with the maximum 𝑛 such
that 𝑆𝑛 ≥ 0. For an infinite random walk where 𝑝 < 𝑞 such an
𝑛 exists with probability 1.
Lemma 4.6. Let 𝑆 be a simple random walk with 𝑝 < 𝑞. The
expected last non-negative step of 𝑆 is: E[max𝑛 : 𝑆𝑛 ≥ 0] = 4𝑝𝑞(𝑞−𝑝)2 .
Proof. We use Lemma 4.5 to find the probability that 𝑆𝑛 is the
unique maximum in {𝑆𝑛, . . . , 𝑆∞} as follows:
Pr[𝑆𝑛 > max({𝑆𝑛+1, . . . , 𝑆∞})] = Pr[𝑋𝑛+1 = −1]·
Pr[𝑆𝑛+1 = max({𝑆𝑛+1, . . . , 𝑆∞})]
= 𝑞 · (1 − 𝑝
𝑞
)
= 𝑞 − 𝑝 .
The last non-negative step must have value exactly zero and as
such must be at an even numbered step. The probability that step
2𝑖 is the last non-negative is:
Pr[(max
𝑛
: 𝑆𝑛 ≥ 0) = 2𝑖] = Pr[𝑆2𝑖 = 0]·






(𝑝𝑞)𝑖 (𝑞 − 𝑝) .
We are now ready to find the expected last non-negative step of
an infinite simple random walk as:
E[max
𝑛














(𝑝𝑞)𝑖 (𝑞 − 𝑝)





















(𝑞−𝑝)3 . See Appendix A for a proof of this identity. □
We are now ready to bound E[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |]. We consider entries
with value at most 𝛽 , i.e., 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑚.
Lemma 4.7. Let 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 𝛾 = 𝛼+2
1+𝛼𝑘
𝑠
− 2. Then the expected
value of |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 | is bounded such that
E[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |] ≤
4𝛼 + 4
𝛼2
+ 4𝛾 + 4
𝛾2
.
Proof. Recall the definition of 𝑃 from Algorithm 3. Let 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑃
denote an element furthest from 𝑦𝑖 that is |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎 | ≤ |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 | for
all 𝑎 ∈ 𝑃 . It it clearly sufficient to consider 𝑦𝑖 for the proof since
|𝑦𝑖 −𝑦𝑖 | ≤ |𝑦𝑖 −𝑦𝑖 |. We first consider the case of 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑖 . It follows
from the definition of 𝑦𝑖 as a maximum that
∑𝑦𝑖
𝑗=𝑦𝑖+1 𝑧ℎ 𝑗 (𝑖), 𝑗 ≤ 0.
As such at least half the bits (𝑧ℎ𝑦𝑖+1 (𝑖),𝑦𝑖+1, . . . , 𝑧ℎ𝑦𝑖 (𝑖),𝑦𝑖 ) must be
zero, that is they were flipped by randomized response in Step (3)
of Algorithm 2. As such the length of the longest interval ending
at bit 𝑧ℎ𝑦𝑖 (𝑖),𝑦𝑖 where at least half the bits were flipped is an upper
bound on the value of 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 . The expected size of said interval is
bounded by the expected last non-negative step of a simple random
walk with 𝑝 = 1𝛼+2 . It follows from Lemma 4.6 that:












We can use a similar argument when 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑦𝑖 to show that at
least half the bits in (𝑧ℎ𝑦𝑖+1 (𝑖),𝑦𝑖+1, . . . , 𝑧ℎ𝑦𝑖 (𝑖),𝑦𝑖 ) must be 1 since
𝑦𝑖 is a maximum. In this case we have to consider the possibility
of hash collisions. Each hash function maps to [𝑠] and at most 𝑘
entries result in a hash collision. The probability of a hash collision
is at most
𝑘
𝑠 using a union bound. As such for 𝑗 > 𝑦𝑖 we have
Pr[𝑧ℎ 𝑗 (𝑖), 𝑗 = 1] ≤ (1 −
𝑘
𝑠 ) · 𝑝 +
𝑘
𝑠 · 𝑞 =
1+𝛼𝑘
𝑠






such that E[𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 | 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑦𝑖 ] ≤ 4𝛾+4𝛾2 by Lemma 4.6 and the
calculation above. We isolate 𝛾 to find:
1
𝛾 + 2 =
1 + 𝛼𝑘𝑠
𝛼 + 2
(⇔) 𝛾 + 2 = 𝛼 + 2
1 + 𝛼𝑘𝑠
(⇔) 𝛾 = 𝛼 + 2
1 + 𝛼𝑘𝑠
− 2 .
Note that 𝛾 > 0 holds due to the requirement 𝑠 > 2𝑘 of Algo-
rithm 2. By conditional expectation, we may upper bound the total
expected error by
E[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |] ≤ E[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |]
≤ E[𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 | 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑖 ] + E[𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 | 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑦𝑖 ]
≤ 4𝛼 + 4
𝛼2




As such we can bound the expected per-entry error for entries
with a true value of at most 𝛽 by a function of the parameters 𝛼
and 𝑠 . In Section 6 we discuss the choice of these parameters based




Lemma 4.8. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1) and 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘). Then the expected per-
entry error of Algorithm 3 is E[|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 |] ≤ max(0, 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽) +𝑂 (1).
Proof. It follows from Lemmas 4.4 and 4.7 that the expected
error for any entry bounded by 𝛽 is:




+ 4𝛼 + 4
𝛼2




where 𝛾 = 𝛼+2
1+𝛼𝑘
𝑠
− 2. Entries above 𝛽 have an additional error
of up to 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽 , since 𝑦𝑖 =𝑚 and 𝑦𝑖 > 𝑚 are represented identically
in the embedding by Algorithm 2. Since 𝛼 and 𝑘𝑠 are constants we
have:
E[|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 |] ≤ max(0, 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽) +𝑂 (1) .
□
Next, we bound the tail probabilities for the per-entry error of the
mechanism. We bound the error of the estimate 𝑦𝑖 , which implies
bounds on the error of the mechanism.
Lemma 4.9. Let 𝛾 = 𝛼+2
1+𝛼𝑘
𝑠
− 2 and 𝜏 > 0. Let 𝑝 = 1𝛾+2 and
𝑞 = 1 − 𝑝 . Then for Algorithm 3 we have:
Pr[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 | ≥ 𝜏] ≤
2 · (4𝑝𝑞)𝜏/2
√
𝜋 (𝑞 − 𝑝)
,
Proof. Let 𝑆 be a simple random walk. We find an upper bound
on the probability that the position of the last non-negative step in
𝑆 is at least 𝜏 :
Pr[(max
𝑛







(𝑝𝑞) 𝑗 (𝑞 − 𝑝)














𝜋 (𝑞 − 𝑝)
,






when 𝑗 ≥ 1 [9].
The last inequality follows from 1−4𝑝𝑞 = (𝑞−𝑝)2. As discussed in
the proof of Lemma 4.7, the expectation of |𝑦𝑖 −𝑦𝑖 | can be bounded
by two random walks each with 𝑝 at most 1𝛾+2 . □
Lemma 4.10. Let 𝛾 = 𝛼+2
1+𝛼𝑘
𝑠
− 2, 𝑝 = 1𝛾+2 and 𝑞 = 1 − 𝑝 . With
probability at least 1 −𝜓 for Algorithm 3 we have:









Proof. We set𝜓 =
2· (4𝑝𝑞)𝜏/2√



























By Lemma 4.9 we have: Pr[|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 | ≤ 𝜏] ≥ 1 −𝜓 . □
Up to constant factors, the tail probabilities of our mechanism
are similar to the properties of the Laplace mechanism summarized
in Proposition 2.7. The probabilities depend on the parameters of
the mechanism. In Section 6 we fix the parameters and evaluate the
error in practice. We summarize the tail probabilities for |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 |
in Lemma 4.11.
Lemma 4.11. Let 𝛾 = 𝛼+2
1+𝛼𝑘
𝑠
− 2, 𝑝 = 1𝛾+2 , 𝑞 = 1 − 𝑝 , 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝛽 , and
𝜏 ≥ 𝛼 . Then for Algorithm 3 we have:
Pr[|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 | ≥ 𝜏] <
2 · (4𝑝𝑞) (𝜏/2𝛼)−1/2
√
𝜋 (𝑞 − 𝑝)
,
With probability at least 1 −𝜓 we have:










ª®®¬ · 𝛼 .
Proof. It is easy to see that |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥 ′𝑖 | < (1 + |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |) · 𝛼 holds,
as the error of random rounding is strictly less than 1. The bounds
follow from Lemmas 4.9 and 4.10. □
4.3 Generalization to Y-differential privacy
We now generalize the ALP mechanism from 1-differential privacy
to satisfying Y-differential privacy. A natural approach is to use a
function of Y as the parameter for randomized response in Algo-
rithm 2. The projection algorithm is Y-differentially private if we
remove the scaling step and set 𝑝 = 1Y+2 . However, the expected
per-entry error would be bounded by
8Y+8
Y2
by Equation 1 (with-






small values of Y. Other approaches modifying the value of 𝑝 have
a similar expectation.
In the following, we use a simple pre-processing and post-processing
step to achieve optimal error. The idea is to scale the input vector as
well as the parameter 𝛽 by Y before running Algorithm 2. We scale
back the estimates from Algorithm 3 by 1/Y. These generalizations
are given as Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5, respectively.
Lemma 4.12. Algorithm 4 satisfies Y-differential privacy.
Proof. It follows from the proof of Lemma 4.1 that for any
subset of outputs 𝑆 we have
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′) ∈𝑆 ]





Parameters :𝛼, 𝛽, Y > 0, and 𝑠 ∈ N.
Input :𝑘-sparse vector 𝑥 ∈ R𝑑+, where 𝑠 > 2𝑘 .
Sequence of hash functions from domain [𝑑]






Output :Y-differentially private representation of 𝑥 .
(1) Scale the entries of 𝑥 such that 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 · Y.
(2) Let ℎ, 𝑧 = ALP1-projection𝛼,𝛽 ·Y,𝑠 (𝑥, ℎ).
(3) Release ℎ and 𝑧.
Algorithm 5: ALP-estimator
Parameters :𝛼, Y > 0.
Input :Embedding 𝑧 ∈ {0, 1}𝑠×𝑚 . Sequence of hash
functions ℎ = (ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚). Index 𝑖 ∈ [𝑑].
Output :Estimate of 𝑥𝑖 .




As such for any pair of neighboring vectors 𝑥 and 𝑥 ′ we have:
Pr[ALP-projection(𝑥 ′) ∈ 𝑆]
Pr[ALP-projection(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆] =
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥 ′) ∈ 𝑆]
Pr[ALP1-projection(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆]
≤ 𝑒 ∥𝑥−𝑥
′ ∥1 = 𝑒Y · ∥𝑥−𝑥
′ ∥1 ≤ 𝑒Y .
□
Lemma 4.13. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1) and 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘). The output of Algo-
rithm 4 can be stored using 𝑂 (𝑘𝛽Y) bits.












= 𝑂 (𝑘𝛽Y). □
Lemma 4.14. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1) and 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘). Then the expected per-
entry error of Algorithm 5 is E[|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 |] ≤ max(0, 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽) +𝑂 (1/Y)
and the evaluation time is 𝑂 (𝛽Y).
Proof. It is clear that the error of Algorithm 5 is
1
Y times the
error of Algorithm 3 for entries at most 𝛽 . As such the expected per-
entry error follows from Lemma 4.8. The evaluation time follows
directly from Lemma 4.3. □
Lemma 4.15. Let 𝛾 = 𝛼+2
1+𝛼𝑘
𝑠
− 2, 𝑝 = 1𝛾+2 , 𝑞 = 1 − 𝑝 , 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝛽 , and
𝜏 ≥ 𝛼Y . Then for Algorithm 5 we have:
Pr[|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 | ≥ 𝜏] <
2 · (4𝑝𝑞) (𝜏Y/2𝛼)−1/2
√
𝜋 (𝑞 − 𝑝)
,
With probability at least 1 −𝜓 we have:














Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 4.11. □
Algorithm 6: Threshold [5]
Parameters :Y, 𝑡 > 0.
Input :𝑘-sparse vector 𝑥 ∈ R𝑑+.
Output :Y-differentially private representation of 𝑥 .
(1) Let 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + [𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∈ [𝑑], where [𝑖 ∼ Lap(1/Y).
(2) Truncate entries below 𝑡 :
𝑣𝑖 =
{
𝑣𝑖 , if 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑡
0, otherwise
(3) Return 𝑣 .
We are now ready to state the following theorem which summa-
rizes the properties of the ALP mechanism.
Theorem 4.16. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1), 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘). Then there exist an
algorithm where the expected per-entry error is𝑂 (1/Y) for all entries,
the access time is 𝑂 (𝑢Y), and the space usage is 𝑂 (𝑘𝑢Y) bits.
Proof. By setting 𝛽 = 𝑢, it follows directly from Lemmas 4.13
and 4.14. □
The space usage and access time of the mechanism both scale
linearly with the parameter 𝛽 . As such the mechanism performs
well only for small values of 𝑢. However, in many contexts 𝑢 scales
with the input size. One example is a histogram, where 𝑢 is the
number of rows in the underlying dataset. Next, we show how to
handle such cases.
5 COMBINED DATA STRUCTURE
In this section, we combine the ALP mechanism with techniques
from previous work to improve space requirements and access time.
As shown in Theorem 4.16 the ALP mechanism performs well when
all entries are bounded by a small value. The per-entry error is low
only for entries bounded by 𝛽 but the space requirements and access
time scale linearly with 𝛽 . Some of the algorithms from previous
work perform well for large entries but have large per-entry error
for small values. The idea of this section is to combine the ALP
mechanism with such an algorithm to construct a composite data
structure that performs well for both small and large entries.
To handle large values, we use the thresholding technique from
Cormode et al. [5]. It adds noise to each entry, but only stores
entries above a threshold. The pseudocode of the algorithm is given
as Algorithm 6.
Lemma 5.1. Algorithm 6 satisfies Y-differential privacy.
Proof. The algorithm is equivalent to the Laplace mechanism
followed by post-processing. The Laplace mechanism satisfies Y-
differential privacy, and privacy is preserved under post-processing
as stated by Lemma 2.2. □
Lemma 5.2. Let 𝑡 = ln(𝑑/2)Y . Then the output of Algorithm 6 is
𝑂 (𝑘)-sparse with high probability.
Proof. Using Definition 2.5 we find that the probability of stor-
ing a zero entry is:







Algorithm 7: Threshold ALP-projection
Parameters :𝛼, Y1, Y2 > 0, and 𝑠 ∈ N.
Input :𝑘-sparse vector 𝑥 ∈ R𝑑+, where 𝑠 > 2𝑘 .
Sequence of hash functions from domain [𝑑]






Output : (Y1 + Y2)-differentially private representation
of 𝑥 .




(2) Let 𝑣 = ThresholdY1,𝑡 (𝑥).
(3) Let ℎ, 𝑧 = ALP-projection𝛼,Y2,𝑡,𝑠 (𝑥, ℎ)
(4) Return 𝑣 , ℎ and 𝑧.
By linearity of expectation, the expected number of stored true zero
entries is at most one, and as such the vector is 𝑂 (𝑘)-sparse with
high probability. □
As discussed in Section 3, the expected per-entry error of Al-





for worst-case input. We combine the al-
gorithm with the ALP mechanism from the previous section to
achieve 𝑂 (1/Y) expected per-entry error for any input. We use the
threshold parameter 𝑡 as value for parameter 𝛽 in Algorithm 4. The
algorithm is presented in Algorithm 7.
Lemma 5.3. Algorithm 7 satisfies (Y1 + Y2)-differential privacy.
Proof. The two parts of the algorithm are independent as there
is no shared randomness. The first part of the algorithm satisfies
Y1-differential privacy by Lemma 5.1 and the second part satisfies
Y2-differential privacy by Lemma 4.12. As such it follows directly
from composition (Lemma 2.3) that Algorithm 7 satisfies (Y1 + Y2)-
differential privacy. □
Lemma 5.4. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1), 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘), Y1 = Θ(Y2). Then the
output of Algorithm 7 is stored using 𝑂 (𝑘 log(𝑑 + 𝑢)) bits with high
probability.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 5.2 that we can store 𝑣 using
𝑂 (𝑘 log(𝑑+𝑢)) bits with high probability. Since 𝛽 = 𝑡 it follows from
Lemma 4.13 that we can store ℎ and 𝑧 using𝑂 (𝑘𝑡Y2) = 𝑂 (𝑘 log(𝑑))
bits. □
To estimate an entry, we access 𝑣 when a value is stored for
the entry and the ALP embedding otherwise. This algorithm is
presented in Algorithm 8.
Lemma 5.5. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1), 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘), and Y1 = Θ(Y2). Let 𝑣 , ℎ,
and 𝑧 be the output of Algorithm 7 given these parameters. Then the
evaluation time of Algorithm 8 is 𝑂 (log(𝑑)). The expected per-entry






Proof. The evaluation time follows from Lemma 4.14. That is,
the evaluation time is 𝑂 (𝛽Y) = 𝑂 (𝑡Y) = 𝑂 (log(𝑑)).
The error depends on both parts of the algorithm. The expected
per-entry error for the 𝑖th entry ismax(0, 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽) +𝑂 (1/Y2) when
𝑣𝑖 = 0 by Lemma 4.14. That is, when [𝑖 is less than 𝛽 − 𝑥𝑖 in Algo-
rithm 6. When 𝑣𝑖 ≠ 0 the error is the absolute value of [𝑖 . That is,
Algorithm 8: Threshold ALP-estimator
Parameters :𝛼, Y2 > 0.
Input :Vector 𝑣 ∈ R𝑑+. Embedding 𝑧 ∈ {0, 1}𝑠×𝑚 .
Sequence of hash functions ℎ = (ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚).
Index 𝑖 ∈ [𝑑].
Output :Estimate of 𝑥𝑖 .




𝑣𝑖 , if 𝑣𝑖 ≠ 0
ALP-estimatorY2,𝛼 (𝑧, ℎ, 𝑖), otherwise
(2) Return 𝑥𝑖 .
we can analyze it using conditional probability and the probability
density function of the Laplace distribution from Definition 2.4.
E[|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 |] = E[|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 | | 𝑣𝑖 = 0] · Pr[𝑣𝑖 = 0]
+ E[|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 | | 𝑣𝑖 ≠ 0] · Pr[𝑣𝑖 ≠ 0]

























|𝑣 − 𝑥𝑖 | ·
Y1
2
𝑒−|𝑣−𝑥𝑖 |Y1 𝑑𝑣 +𝑂 (1/Y2)
= 𝑂 (1/Y1) +𝑂 (1/Y2) = 𝑂 (1/Y) .


















5.1 Removing the dependency on dimension
To make access time independent of the dimension 𝑑 , we can turn
to approximate differential privacy. This allows us to use a smaller
threshold in the initial thresholding approach, which in turn results
in smaller values for 𝛽 in the ALP mechanism.
The following algorithm is similar to that introduced by Korolova
et al. [13], which we discussed in Section 3. It adds noise to non-zero
entries only, and uses a threshold to satisfy approximate differential
privacy. Our algorithm differs from the work of Korolova et al. by
using a random rounding step. This step is not needed in a discrete
setting, where at most a single zero-valued entry is changed to a
non-zero entry for neighboring vectors. However, in the real-valued
context, several zero entries can change.
Lemma 5.6. Algorithm 9 satisfies (Y, 𝛿)-differential privacy.
Proof. Let 𝑥 and 𝑥 ′ be neighboring vectors. We consider two





), if 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 1
𝑥𝑖 , otherwise;
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Algorithm 9: Threshold2 (Following technique by [13])
Parameters :Y, 𝛿 > 0.
Input :𝑘-sparse vector 𝑥 ∈ R𝑑+.
Output : (Y, 𝛿)-differentially private approximation of 𝑥 .




RandRound (𝑥𝑖 ) , if 0 < 𝑥𝑖 < 1
𝑥𝑖 , otherwise
(2) Let 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 + [𝑖 for all non-zero entries, where
[𝑖 ∼ Lap(1/Y).
(3) Let 𝑡 =
ln (1/𝛿)
Y + 2.
(4) Truncate entries below 𝑡 :
𝑣𝑖 =
{
𝑣𝑖 , if 𝑦𝑖 ≠ 0 and 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑡
0, otherwise
(5) Return 𝑣 .
𝑥 ′𝑖 =
{
1, if 𝑥 ′
𝑖




The vectors are constructed such that 𝑥 and 𝑥 can only differ for
entries at most 1 in both vectors. The same holds for 𝑥 ′ and 𝑥 ′.
Additionally, the ℓ1-distance is still at most 1 between any pair of
vectors.
We find the probability of outputting anything for an entry less
than or equal to 1 as:
Pr[𝑣𝑖 ≠ 0|𝑥𝑖 ≤ 1] = Pr[𝑦𝑖 = 1] · Pr[Lap(1/Y) ≥ 𝑡 − 1]











2 · 𝑒Y .
Since 𝑥 and 𝑥 only differ for entries less than or equal to 1 we
have for any subset of outputs 𝑆 :




|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 |
𝛿
2 · 𝑒Y
≤ Pr[Threshold2(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆] + 𝛿
2 · 𝑒Y .
The inequality holds in both directions and for the pair of 𝑥 ′ and
𝑥 ′ as well.
By definition 𝑥 and 𝑥 ′ only differ for entries of at least 1. As such
we can ignore the random rounding step and we have:
Pr[Threshold2(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ 𝑒 ∥𝑥−𝑥
′ ∥1Y Pr[Threshold2(𝑥 ′) ∈ 𝑆]
≤ 𝑒Y · Pr[Threshold2(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆] .
Using the inequalities above we have:
Pr[Threshold2(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ Pr[Threshold2(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆] + 𝛿
2𝑒Y









≤ 𝑒Y · Pr[Threshold2(𝑥 ′) ∈ 𝑆] + 𝛿 .
□





. Then the expected maximum error of












, since we add noise to at most 𝑘 entries. By removing





. As such the expected
maximum error for worst-case input is:

















In the following, we use Algorithm 9 instead of Algorithm 6 in
Step (2) of Algorithm 7.
Lemma 5.8. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1), 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘), Y1 = Θ(Y2), and 𝛿 > 0 with
𝛿 = 𝑂 (1/𝑘). By using Algorithm 9 in Algorithm 7 the access time is
𝑂 (log(1/𝛿)). The expected per-entry error is𝑂 (1/Y) and the expected





. The combined mechanism satisfies
(Y1 + Y2, 𝛿)-differential privacy.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proofs of Lemmas 5.3 and 5.5.
□
Lemma 5.9. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1), 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘), and Y1 = Θ(Y2). Then
the memory requirement of combining Algorithm 9 and the ALP
mechanism is 𝑂 (𝑘 (log(𝑑 + 𝑢) + log(1/𝛿))).
Proof. The output of Algorithm 9 is always 𝑘-sparse and can
be represented using 𝑂 (𝑘 log(𝑑 + 𝑢)) bits. We set 𝛽 = ln(1/𝛿)Y2 + 2
and therefore ℎ and 𝑧 are represented using 𝑂 (𝑘 log(1/𝛿)) bits by
Lemma 4.13. □
We are now ready to summarize our results for both pure and
approximate differential privacy.
Theorem 5.10. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1), 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘), and Y > 0. Then there






expected maximum error, access time of
𝑂 (log(𝑑)), and space usage of𝑂 (𝑘 log(𝑑 +𝑢)) with high probability.
Proof. It follows directly from Lemmas 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. □
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Theorem 5.11. Let 𝛼 = Θ(1), 𝑠 = Θ(𝑘), and Y, 𝛿 > 0. Then there






expected maximum error, access time of
𝑂 (log(1/𝛿)), and space usage of 𝑂 (𝑘 (log(𝑑 + 𝑢) + log(1/𝛿))).
Proof. It follows directly from Lemmas 5.6, 5.8 and 5.9. □
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we discuss the per-entry error of ALP1-estimator
(Algorithm 3) in practice. Let 𝛾 = 𝛼+2
1+𝛼𝑘
𝑠
− 2. By Lemma 4.4 and 4.7
the expected per-entry error of ALP1-estimator is upper bounded
by:




+ 4𝛼 + 4
𝛼2




Figure 3(a) shows the upper bound for varying values of 𝑘/𝑠 and
𝛼 . Recall that 𝑘/𝑠 is a bound on the probability of a hash collision.
We see that the effect of hash collisions on the error increases for
large values of 𝛼 , as each bit in the embedding is more significant.
We discuss how the upper bound compares to practice next.
Experimental Setup. We designed experiments to evaluate the
effect of the adjustable parameters 𝛼 and 𝑠 on the expected per-
entry error of ALP1-estimator. The experiments were performed on
artificial data. For our setup, we set parameter 𝛽 = 5000 and chose
a true value 𝑥𝑖 uniformly at random in the interval [0, . . . , 𝛽]. We
run only on artificial data, as uniform data does not benefit the al-
gorithm, and we can easily simulate worst-case conditions for hash
collisions. We simulate running the ALP1-projection algorithm by
computing 𝑦𝑖 , simulating hash collisions, and applying randomized
response. The probability for hash collisions is fixed in each experi-
ment and the same probability is used for all bits. This simulates
worst-case input in which all other non-zero entries have a true
value of at least 𝛽 . We increment 𝛼 by steps of 0.1 in the interval
[0.1, . . . , 10] and the probability of a hash collision by 0.05 in the
interval [0, . . . , 0.2]. The probability of 0 serves only as a baseline,
as it is not achievable in practice for 𝑘 > 1. The experiment was
repeated 105 times for every data point.
Figure 3(b) shows plots of the mean absolute error of the exper-
iments. As 𝛼 is increased, the error drops off at first and slowly
climbs. The estimates of 𝑦𝑖 are more accurate for large values of 𝛼 .
However, any inaccuracy is more significant, as 𝑦𝑖 is scaled back
by a larger value. The error from the random rounding step also
increases with 𝛼 . The plots of the upper bound and observed error
follow similar trajectories. However, the upper bound is approxi-
mately twice as large for most parameters.
Fixed Parameters. The experiments show how different values of
𝛼 and 𝑠 affect the expected per-entry error. However, the parameters
also determine constant factors for space usage and access time.
The space requirements scale linearly in
𝑠
𝛼 and the access time is
inversely proportional to 𝛼 . As such, the optimal parameter choice
depends on the use case due to space, access time, and error trade-
offs.
To evaluate the error distribution of the ALP1-estimator algo-
rithm we fixed the parameters of an experiment. We set 𝛼 = 3 and
the hash collision probability to 0.1. We repeated the experiment
106 times.
The error distribution is shown in Figure 3(c). The mean absolute
error of the experiment is 6.4 and the standard deviation is 11.
Plugging in the parameters in Lemma 4.11, with probability at least
0.9 the error is at most












) ≈ 75.33 .
The error of the observed 90th percentile is 15.78, which is shown
in Figure 3(c) using vertical lines. Again, this shows that the upper
bounds are pessimistic.
For comparison, the plots include the Laplace distribution with
scale parameters 1 and 4.5. Note that the Laplace distribution with
parameter 1 is optimal for the privacy budget. The standard devia-
tion of the distribution with scale 4.5 is 6.36 and as such the mean
absolute error is similar to the ALP mechanism.
The distribution is slightly off-center, and the mean error is 2.33.
This is expected due to hash collisions. The effect of hash collisions
is also apparent for the largest observed errors. The lowest observed
error was−114, while the highest was 274. There is a clear trade-off
between space usage and per-entry error. We reran the experiment
with hash collision probability 0.01 using the same value for 𝛼 .
The error improved for all the metrics mentioned above. The mean
absolute error is 4.8, the standard deviation is 7.8, the mean error
is 0.18, the 90th percentile is 11.5, and the largest observed error
is 147.
7 SUGGESTIONS TO PRACTITIONERS
The ALP mechanism introduced in this paper combines the best
of three worlds: It has low error similar to the Laplace mechanism,
produces compact representations using asymptotically optimal
space, and has an access time that scales only with 𝑂 (log𝑑).
In an application that wants to make use of differentially private
histograms/vectors, one first has to get an overview of the assumed
properties of the data before making a choice on which approach
to use. If 𝑑 is small or the data is assumed to be dense, the Laplace
mechanism will offer the best performance. If the data is sparse
and the dimension 𝑑 is large, the analyst must know which error
guarantee she wishes to achieve, and which access time is feasible
in the setting where the application is deployed. If a larger error is
acceptable for “small” entries or access time is crucial, just applying
the thresholding technique [5, 13] is the better choice. Otherwise, if
small error is paramount or an access time of 𝑂 (log𝑑) is sufficient,
the ALP mechanism will provide the best solution.
Variants. We assume in this paper that𝑘 is a known bound on the
sparsity of the input data. However, in some applications the value
of 𝑘 itself is private. Here we briefly discuss approaches in such
settings. We use the value of 𝑘 to select the size of the embedding,
such that the probability of hash collisions is sufficiently small.
When 𝑘 is not known we can still bound the probability of hash
collisions.
If the input is a histogram the sparsity differs by at most 1 for
neighboring datasets. As such we can use a fraction of the pri-
vacy budget to estimate the sparsity. Note that this is not possible
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(a) Upper bound on expected per-entry error (b) Observed mean per-entry error (c) Error distribution 𝛼 = 3 and collisions = 0.1.
Figure 3: Theoretical expected per-entry error and experiment results.
Note that the y-axes for the plots use different scales.
for vectors, as the difference in sparsity can be as large as 𝑑 for
neighboring datasets.
If ∥𝑥 ∥1 = 𝑛 is known then we have ∥𝑥 ∥1 = 𝑛Y for the scaled
input. We can bound the probability of hash collisions by a constant
when the size of the embedding is 𝑂 (𝑛Y) bits. If ∥𝑥 ∥1 is unknown
we can estimate it using a fraction of the privacy budget. Note that
the space differs from the 𝑘-sparse setting, and remains 𝑂 (𝑛Y) bits
when applying the thresholding techniques.
An implementation of a variant of the ALP mechanism is avail-
able as part of the open source project OpenDP (https://opendp.org/)
in the repository https://github.com/opendp/opendp.
8 OPEN PROBLEMS
The main open problem that we leave is if it is possible to achieve
similar space and error with constant time access. We know of a
way (based on the count-min sketch) to achieve optimal expected
error with constant time access and space within a logarithmic
factor of optimal. However, this method does not have strong tail
bounds on the error.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank the anonymous reviewers for their detailed suggestions
that helped improve the paper. Christian Janos Lebeda and Rasmus
Pagh are affiliated with Basic Algorithms Research Copenhagen
(BARC), supported by the VILLUM Foundation grant 16582.
REFERENCES
[1] Sven Erick Alm. 2002. Simple random walk. Unpublished manuscript (2002).
http://www2.math.uu.se/~sea/kurser/stokprocmn1/slumpvandring_eng.pdf
[2] Victor Balcer and Salil P. Vadhan. 2019. Differential Privacy on Finite Computers.
J. Priv. Confidentiality 9, 2 (2019).
[3] Mark Bun, Kobbi Nissim, and Uri Stemmer. 2019. Simultaneous Private Learning
of Multiple Concepts. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 20 (2019), 94:1–94:34.
[4] Larry Carter and Mark N. Wegman. 1979. Universal Classes of Hash Functions.
J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 18, 2 (1979), 143–154.
[5] Graham Cormode, Cecilia M. Procopiuc, Divesh Srivastava, and Thanh T. L. Tran.
2012. Differentially private summaries for sparse data. In ICDT. ACM, 299–311.
[6] Martin Dietzfelbinger, Torben Hagerup, Jyrki Katajainen, and Martti Pentto-
nen. 1997. A Reliable Randomized Algorithm for the Closest-Pair Problem. J.
Algorithms 25, 1 (1997), 19–51.
[7] Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam D. Smith. 2016. Cali-
brating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis. J. Priv. Confidentiality 7, 3
(2016), 17–51.
[8] Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth. 2014. The Algorithmic Foundations of Differen-
tial Privacy. Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci. 9, 3-4 (2014), 211–407.
[9] Noam D. Elkies. 2013. Upper limit on the central binomial coeffi-
cient. https://mathoverflow.net/questions/133732/upper-limit-on-the-central-
binomial-coefficient. [Online; accessed 15-September-2021].
[10] Ronald L. Graham, Donald E. Knuth, and Oren Patashnik. 1994. Concrete Mathe-
matics: A Foundation for Computer Science, 2nd Ed. Addison-Wesley.
[11] Torben Hagerup. 1998. Sorting and Searching on the Word RAM. In STACS
(Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1373). Springer, 366–398.
[12] Moritz Hardt and Kunal Talwar. 2010. On the geometry of differential privacy.
In STOC. ACM, 705–714.
[13] Aleksandra Korolova, Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Nina Mishra, and Alexandros
Ntoulas. 2009. Releasing search queries and clicks privately. In WWW. ACM,
171–180.
[14] Fragkiskos Koufogiannis, Shuo Han, and George J. Pappas. 2015. Optimality of
the Laplace Mechanism in Differential Privacy. CoRR abs/1504.00065 (2015).
[15] Stanley LWarner. 1965. Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminating
evasive answer bias. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 60, 309 (1965), 63–69.
13
A CLOSED-FORM PROOF OF LEMMA 4.6
Here we provide a closed-form expression used in the proof of
Lemma 4.6.







𝑟 (𝑟 − 1) . . . (𝑟 − 𝑘 + 2) (𝑟 − 𝑘 + 1)
𝑘!
,
and the binomial theorem ([10, Equation 5.12]):
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Let 𝑝 = 𝑎
𝑎+𝑏 and 𝑞 =
𝑏
𝑎+𝑏 . Then we have:











= (𝑞 − 𝑝)2 .
Finally, let 𝑝 < 𝑞 and let 𝑧 = 𝑝𝑞. This gives us the closed-form
expression:
∞∑︁
𝑘=0
𝑘
(
2𝑘
𝑘
)
(𝑝𝑞)𝑘 = 2𝑝𝑞
(1 − 4𝑝𝑞)3/2
=
2𝑝𝑞
((𝑞 − 𝑝)2)3/2
=
2𝑝𝑞
(𝑞 − 𝑝)3
.
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